Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) imposes greenhouse gas emission limits for Annex 1 countries (i.e., the OECD countries and countries with economies in transition) as listed in Annex B of the Protocol.
Together, Annex 1 countries must reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHG) by 5.2% below 1990 levels over the commitment period [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . The Protocol also incorporates emissions trading, joint implementation and the clean development mechanism (CDM) to help Annex 1 countries meet their Kyoto targets at a lower overall cost, but it leaves all of the details concerning these flexibility mechanisms open for further negotiations.
The Protocol will become effective once it has been ratified by at least 55 parties whose CO 2 emissions represent at least 55% of the total emissions from all Annex 1 parties in the year On the other hand, the EU put forward a proposal for quantitative ceilings on the use of flexibility mechanisms (European Union, 1999) , insisting that domestic abatement actions should be a main means of meeting emissions reductions required of each Annex 1 country (in other words, at least half of the emissions reductions required have to be undertaken domestically). This supplementary requirement caused the deepest division between the EU and the Umbrella Group countries and was regarded as one of the main causes for the collapse of the COP6.
Soon after coming into office, the President Bush decided that the US would withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol. Quick to accept that the US would not re-enter the negotiations, the EU led a sustained diplomatic effort to keep the Kyoto Protocol alive (Legge, 2001) . While the Group of 77 (G77) and China 2 moderated some of their demands, the EU softened its stance on the extent of usage of sinks and flexibility mechanisms to secure the reluctant support of other Umbrella Group members for the Protocol at the resumed COP6 held in Bonn, July 2001. After tough negotiations, the political compromises were eventually reached on a number of key implementation issues of the Kyoto Protocol. This political deal, called the Bonn Agreement, was translated into the detailed legal text, called the Marrakech Accords, at the seventh Conference of the Parties (COP7) to the UNFCCC held in Marrakech, November 2001, which was expected to be easy but turned out to be another difficult meeting.
The Kyoto Protocol, as detailed in the Marrakech Accords, has been rendered fit for its ratification at the World Summit on Sustainable Development to be held Johannesburg, September 2002.
The Bonn Agreement allows for significant credits for carbon dioxide sinks.
Specifically, the following activities related to land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) are allowed to be counted as sinks: forest management under Article 3.4, whose credits are capped to country-specific limits as given in Appendix Z and which total 83 million tons of carbon (MtC) per year; 3 agricultural land management and revegetation activities under Article 3.4 on a net-net accounting basis without an explicit cap; afforestation and reforestation projects to be eligible under the CDM, whose contribution to a party's 3 assigned amount is capped at 1% of five times the party's base year emissions (UNFCCC, 2001 ).
With the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, the EU dropped its previous insistence on a cap on the use of flexibility mechanisms. The final wording at the Bonn Agreement is now that "domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort" by each Annex 1 country. This is a very important and positive development because it will allow countries and businesses to reduce their emissions wherever it is cheapest to do so.
Ironically, it is a development that the US had lobbied intensively for during previous rounds of international climate negotiations.
Earlier economic modeling studies focus on investigating economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness of meeting the original Kyoto reduction target of 5.2%, with and/or without considering the imposition of restrictions on the use of emissions trading (e.g. Bernstein et al., 1999; Bollen et al., 1999; Criqui and Viguier, 2000; Criqui et al., 1999; Ellerman, Jacoby and Decaux, 1998; Ellerman and Wing, 2000; Manne and Richels, 1999; Paltsev, 2000; Weyant, 1999; Zhang, 2000b Zhang, , 2001 ). The results, among others, show that the US is expected to be the biggest single buyer on the international market of tradable permits, and that restrictions on the use of emissions trading to comply with the Kyoto emissions targets will result in substantial efficiency losses. The US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol breaks the balance of the buyers and sellers on the international permit market. The most recent studies focus on the implications of the US withdrawal from the Protocol. A large part of these studies assume perfectly competitive behavior, and show that the US non-ratification leads to a sharp drop in the price of permits on the international market so that the remaining Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 countries can meet their Kyoto targets at much lower costs (Hagem and Holtsman, 2001; Den Elzen and de Moor, 2001; Eyckmans et al., 2001) . With the over-supply of permits, it seems likely that sellers would adapt their behaviors to the weaker demand for emissions permits to maximize their gains. Dominant sellers might defer portion of their excess emissions permits for use in subsequent periods and/or exploit their market power on the permits market (Manne and Richels, 2001; Buchner et al., 2001) . Manne and Richels (2001) have examined the implications of allowing banking of permits, an intertemporal flexibility that allows countries to carry permits that are unused in one commitment period forward for use in the subsequent periods. They have found that the reduction in the compliance costs of the remaining Annex 1 4 countries in the absence of the US ratification would be smaller than what have been suggested.
In the absence of the US ratification, market power on the supply side of the permit market seems likely to be a real issue. The ongoing international climate negotiations might
give us some indications. With the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, Russian participation is essential for the Protocol to enter into force. 4 As would be expected, the Russian Federation has exploited its increased bargaining power by further reducing its obligations. As observed at the recently completed COP7 where the EU and the G77 and China were determined to strike a deal that would ensure sufficient ratification for entry into force of the Protocol, the Russian Federation, both individually and collectively with other members of the Umbrella Group, used this leverage to compel the EU and G77/China to concede many of their demands (IISD, 2001) . Despite the insistence of almost all parties that the Bonn Agreement was sacrosanct, the Russian Federation demanded the renegotiation of the designated amount from forest management activities, and succeeded in increasing the amount from 17.63 MtC per year to 33 MtC.
Several studies have explored the implications of organizing a sellers' cartel (e.g., Böhringer and Löschel, 2001; Manne and Richels, 2001) . But, in our view, there is an ample space for non-competitive supply behavior under Annex 1 emissions trading, and the realistic scenario of market power may lie somewhere in between the extreme scenarios of the perfect competition and the coordinated monopoly. Taking account of sinks credits as agreed in Bonn and Marrakech, this paper aims to illustrate how market power could be exerted in the absence of the US ratification under Annex 1 trading and to explore the potential implications of the non-competitive supply behavior for the international market of tradable permits, compliance costs for the remaining Annex 1 countries to meet their revised Kyoto targets, and the environmental effectiveness. Section 2 provides baseline emissions in 2010 for all Annex 1 regions, effective emissions reductions in all Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 regions and the size of hot air for those Kyoto-unconstrained Annex 1 regions. Section 3 discusses the analytical framework to study the effects of non-competitive supply behavior in the absence 4 The US contributes 36.1% of the total Annex 1 CO 2 emissions in the year 1990, whereas the Russian Federation is responsible for 17.4% (UNFCCC, 1997). The entry into force requires that countries representing at least 55% of the total CO 2 emissions from Annex 1 countries in 1990 ratify the Protocol. Thus, the US and countries responsible for more than 8.9% of the total can block the Protocol from entering into force, implying that Russian ratification is required for the Protocol to enter into force.
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of the US ratification under Annex 1 emissions trading. Section 4 describes our partial equilibrium model based on the marginal abatement costs of seven Annex 1 regions, with the algebraic exposition of the model given in Appendix B. Section 5 presents the policy scenarios examined, whereas Section 6 discusses all simulation results. The paper ends with the main conclusions and further research.
Baseline emissions, the mandated reductions and the size of hot air
The magnitude and distribution of abatement costs of meeting the Kyoto emission constraints depend crucially on the business-as-usual (BAU) projections for emissions. This study takes the year 2010 as representative of the first commitment period 2008-2012. Like other economic modeling studies on compliance costs (see Weyant, 1999) , the study focuses only on CO 2 , partly because CO 2 is the most important of the six greenhouse gases considered under the Kyoto Protocol, and partly because of lack of appropriate abatement cost data for non-CO 2 greenhouse gases. (Nemry, 2001) . As a result of allowing countries to count the amount of sinks credits, the average reduction target for the Annex 1 countries as a whole is reduced to 1.9%, in comparison to the original reduction target of 5.2% (see Table 1 ). The situation in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is quite different. The economic transition led to a large decline in emissions as economies contracted and energy markets were deregulated since the collapse of the Soviet Union. By 1996, greenhouse gas emissions in these countries had declined 20-46% below their base year levels (Zhang, 2001) .
Although economies are projected to begin recovering during the period under review, emissions in most countries with economies in transition in 2010 are expected to remain below their base year levels. In other words, these countries are allocated assigned amounts under the Kyoto Protocol that exceed their anticipated emissions requirements even in the absence of any limitation. If emissions trading were allowed, these countries would be able to trade these excess emissions to other countries, thus creating the hot air that would otherwise have not occurred in the absence of emissions trading (Zhang, 1998 (Zhang, , 2000a . Because the transfer of the hot air does not represent any real emissions reductions by the selling countries, allowing the acquisition of the surplus from the selling countries to meet the buying countries' commitments makes the total emissions even higher than what would be in the absence of emissions trading, although not above the aggregate Kyoto targets (Zhang, 2000b (Paltsev, 2000; Zhang, 2000b (Nemry, 2001) . d Annex 1 total without the US ratification. e Annex 1 total with the US ratification. 
The effects of market power in international emissions trading
A number of theoretical and empirical studies have examined the issue of market power on tradable quota markets (e.g., Hahn, 1984; Misolek and Elder, 1989; Malueg, 1990; Westkog, 1996; Sartzetakis, 1997; Burniaux, 1998; Ellerman and Wing, 2000; Godby, 2000) . They show that either dominant buyers (monopsony/oligopsony) or sellers (monopoly/oligopoly) may be able to exert market power on the permit market or use its market power on the permit market to gain power in the product market. In the following discussion, market power refers only to the capacity to influence the market price of traded permits ("cost minimizing manipulation").
The impact of market power on the price of permits depends on who resides in such a power. In the case of a monopsony, market power under emissions trading results in reduced demand, whereas in the case of a monopoly market power under emissions trading results in reduced supply. A monopsonist may thereby force the permit price below, a monopolist above the competitive level (Misolek and Elder, 1989) . Thus, the extent of competition on a tradable permit market affects the efficiency of international emissions trading and the degree to which potential cost savings are realized. Permit price manipulations result in additional economic costs to achieve the same level of abatement as under a perfect competition and increase the costs of compliance. Whether market power is a real issue in an international greenhouse gas emissions trading depends on how such a trading scheme will take place.
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol creates an intergovernmental emissions trading market next to inter-source trading. 6 In case of inter-source trading in which sub-national entities (e.g., firms) are authorized to trade on the international emissions permit market, the scope of market power seems rather limited. 7 Emissions trading modeled in many economic studies (Weyant, 1999) operates as if governments retain the sole right to trade. As such, emissions 9 trading takes place on a government-to-government basis. Since the majority of inexpensive emissions permits are concentrated in the Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries, these countries may be able to exert market power and extract sizeable economic rents under this trading scheme. The scope for non-competitive supply behavior on Annex 1 permit market is significantly amplified by the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the subsequent deals struck in Bonn and Marrakech. Factoring into the amount of sinks credits in the deals, the amount of EEC and FSU hot air available at no costs exceeds the total amount of emissions reductions required of all remaining Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 countries. The international permit price under Annex 1 trading falls to zero with perfectly competitive supply behavior of EEC and FSU. In this case, emission sales do not create any revenue for the two permit suppliers. Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that EEC and FSU restrict permit supply as a result of monopolistic behavior in order to drive up the international carbon price. Manne and Richels (1999) refer to this case as a sellers' market.
On the demand side, competitive behavior seems to be the appropriate assumption. The reason is that either firms of the OECD countries are allowed to engage in emissions trading directly as proposed in the recent EU-wide emissions trading scheme, 8 or coordination of several individual OECD countries to organize a buyers' cartel seems rather difficult in case of intergovernmental emissions trading.
Given the revised emissions targets at the COP7, the effects of supply side restrictions are illustrated in Figure 1 . The amount of hot air (H) is greater than the total abatement requirements of non-US Annex 1 countries (Q u ). Consequently, market price under perfect competition is zero (P u = 0) and the quantity of permits traded equals the total abatement requirement (Q u ). There is no domestic abatement of Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 countries.
Emissions of permit importers equal the BAU emission levels ( ) e . Total revenues for permit exporting countries equal zero. With supply side restrictions, the supply of permits is reduced from S u to S r . This drives up the market price of permits from P u to P r . The total volume of permits traded is reduced from Q u to Q r . The exercise of monopoly power entails a redistribution of the gains from emissions trading from buyers to sellers and a loss of efficiency. Permit exporters receive the rectangle IJK0, which represents the total income from permit sales. They benefit from further supply restrictions as long as the gains from higher prices are greater than the loss of revenues from a lower level of permits sold. Due to the higher price of permits, importing countries increase domestic abatement (a), thus reducing emissions from BAU emissions e to e. The remaining abatement requirements up to the revised Kyoto target (k) is met through permit import (q). The costs of compliance for a permit importer increase to LMNW, of which LMVW is the income transfer to permit exporters and MNV is the increased resource cost (deadweight loss). The economic efficiency of emissions trading is reduced under market power since marginal abatement costs (C') are not equalized across regions. The loss in efficiency relative to the competitive case depends on the amount of permits initially allocated to the regions (Hahn, 1984) . With noncompetitive supply behavior, some part of hot air is suppressed (Q u -Q r ) and thus the environmental effectiveness is increased. 
Partial equilibrium model of non-competitive supply behavior
We assess the effects of non-competitive supply behavior in a partial equilibrium setup using marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for different Annex 1 regions in the year 2010 (see Appendix B for the algebraic exposition of the model). These curves represent the marginal cost of reducing carbon emissions by different amounts within an economy.
Marginal costs of abatement differ considerably across countries due to differences in the carbon intensity, initial energy price levels and the substitution possibilities in the respective economy.
The MAC curves used here are generated by the world energy system model POLES (Criqui et al., 1996) , which embodies a detailed bottom-up description of regional energy markets and world-wide energy trade. To get the marginal abatement cost curves, we run the model under progressively stringent carbon constraints for the year 2010. The shadow price of carbon is plotted against the abatement levels and we fit a constant elasticity function to the model results using a least-squares procedure. The coefficients of the marginal abatement cost curve approximations of the form MAC = α⋅(ABATEMENT) β are given in Table 2 . 9 The MAC analysis is a partial equilibrium approach since it does not consider all the spillover effects of carbon abatement policies and monopolistic pricing on other markets. For instance, abating countries do not take into account the effects of carbon reduction efforts on energy prices and thereby its terms of trade. However, it provides a convenient way to analyze the effects of different assumptions on non-competitive supply side behavior. This distinction aims to examine how the US withdrawal from the Protocol affects compliance costs of other Annex 1 countries and environmental effectiveness vis-à-vis full Annex 1 trading.
As discussed in Section 3, the assumption of perfectly competitive supply behavior seems unrealistic. Given FSU and EEC as the dominant suppliers of emissions permits on the international market, it is not in their interest to sell excess permits at zero price. Instead, they may exert market power to maximize their revenues from selling permits. To illustrate how market power could be exerted under Annex 1 trading and to explore the effects of the noncompetitive supply behavior, we set up the following three scenarios:
CARTEL FSU and EEC coordinate their permit supply to maximize joint profits forming a sellers' cartel. This is in effect a monopoly, and the members of the cartel share the monopolistic profits. All other regions behave as price takers, i.e. they minimize their abatement costs given the permit price set by the two regions.
NASH FSU and EEC behave non-cooperatively and do not coordinate their permit supply. Instead, they act independently of each other, with each region 14 attempting to maximize its profit by choosing its own permit supply. This structure on the permits market is analyzed for a duopoly competing in quantities using the Nash equilibrium concept.
MONOP
Only FSU acts as a monopoly. EEC is treated as a competitive fringe (price taker) following the price leadership of the dominant supplier FSU.
Simulation results

A. NOTRADE
Without emissions trading, each Annex 1 country must meet its Kyoto abatement commitment as indicated in Table 1 In what follows, we will discuss the effects of emissions trading under the different policy scenarios considered subsequently. Unless otherwise specified, all the numbers cited in this section are given in Table 3 .
B. TRADE -The effects of Annex 1 emissions trading under perfect competition TRADE w/o US
In the absence of the US ratification, the price of permits under perfect 
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TRADE w/t US
C. CARTEL -EEC and FSU coordinate permit supply
Our first specification of non-competitive behavior looks at the cooperative solution.
The strategies of EEC and FSU are coordinated so as to attain the best result for the group. In so doing, they form a cartel and act as a monopoly in order to maximize its profit from permit sales, which is then divided among themselves by some prearranged rule. The cartel faces the downward sloping residual demand curve (the curve D in Figure 5 ). The aggregate cartel restricts the supply of permits until the marginal revenue from permit sales is equal to marginal abatement cost, i.e. equal to zero for hot air supply. At this point, the higher price just compensates for the decrease in the quantity exported, and the demand elasticity is equal to unity. The more inelastic the demand curve facing the cartel, the higher the price the cartel can set and the greater its profit. Monopolization has the expected effects: the cartel supplies only 126 MtC permits to the market. The market price with monopolistic supply is raised to 66 US$/tC in comparison with zero in the absence of the US ratification under perfect Annex 1 trading. This is the maximum price that can be attained with supply side restrictions.
Consequently, gains from trading are reduced from US$ 18.2 bn under perfect competition to US$ 13.4 bn under a supply cartel (see Table 3 ). This is mainly because Kyoto-constrained Expenditures for permit purchases are transferred to the cartel suppliers EEC and FSU.
Thus, the total (maximum) gain of the cartel equals the total expenditures for permit purchases, which amount to US$ 8.3 bn. In comparison with zero profits from permit sales under a perfect competition, such dramatic increases in profits enhance the incentive for the two regions to coordinate their permit sales. The cartel must decide how the monopoly profit of the cartel is to be divided among EEC and FSU. The range of possible cooperative solutions can be narrowed down. The payoffs to the two participants cannot add up to more than US$ 8.3 bn. Since each region can choose to go alone, neither will accept a payoff less than under the NASH scenario derived later (US$ 3.1 bn for EEC and US$ 4.4 bn for FSU).
Thus, all points on the solid line AB in Figure 3 are possible solutions to the bargaining problem (solution set). There have been several cooperative game solution concepts proposed.
We consider only the egalitarian solution here. The symmetric or even split point is given by E (US$ 0.4 bn for EEC, US$ 0.4 bn for FSU). The profit of EEC amounts then to US$ 3.5 bn, that of FSU to 4.8 bn US$. It is undecided, however, how much is supplied to the market by each region. If, for example, EEC supplies its 56 MtC of hot air, it receives 3.7 bn US$ from permit sales and must pay US$ 0.2 bn as a side payment to FSU. Given the larger bargaining power by FSU, the cooperative solution may lay more towards point A. break apart. Whether this is going to happen depends on the regions' willingness to commit themselves to efficiently coordinated strategies, which in turn boils down to the design of an international emissions trading scheme. This is the greatest challenge ahead for EEC and FSU to reap monopolistic profits from coordinating their permit sales, given that the two regions comprise of a number of countries.
D. NASH: EEC and FSU as a Cournot duopoly
The second specification of non-competitive behavior assumes that EEC and FSU act independently of each other, and each region attempts to maximize its profit by choosing its own permit supply. We use a Cournot model of duopoly, where the two regions simultaneously set their quantity supplied to the permits market. Both regions have to consider their rival region's behavior to determine their own optimal choice of permit supply.
The maximum profit action by one region, given its beliefs about the action taken by its rival, is represented by the best-response (or reaction) function. A Nash equilibrium corresponds with an intersection of the two best-response functions. In the Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate from his prescribed strategy. Each region sells the quantity of permits that maximizes its profits given its (correct) beliefs about other regions' choice of permit supply. Reaction curves are drawn in Figure 4 . The best response function of FSU (BR FSU ) has two significant points: if EEC supplies zero permits, FSU provides 126 MtC. This is the cartel (monopoly) output level, since a Cournot player without competition faces the market demand curve. If EEC supplies 298 MtC, the total emission reduction required of the Kyotoconstrained Annex 1 regions, FSU provides zero permits. However, the two regions are not identical. FSU has hot air of 296 MtC and will not be engaged in any abatement activities.
EEC, on the other hand, has hot air of only 56 MtC. The permit exports beyond the amount of hot air are generated by undertaking domestic abatement efforts to earn additional profits. As indicated in Figure 5 , the market equilibrium under Nash lies just between the CARTEL and the MONOP solutions on the market demand curve D. Clearly, the supply restrictions imposed as a result of different degree of monopoly power on the permit market all result in, to some extent, an increase in the international permit price and real emission reduction. With the US participation, the residual demand curve faced by the suppliers FSU and EEC with supply curve S is depicted by the curve D US . In this case, the competitive permit market equilibrium is given by TRD US . 
Conclusions and further research
The US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol topples the balance of the buyers and sellers on the international market of tradable permits. With the over-supply of permits, it seems likely that sellers would adapt their behavior to the weaker demand for emissions permits to maximize their gains. Taking account of sinks credits as agreed in Bonn and Marrakech, this paper has illustrated how market power could be exerted in the absence of the US ratification under Annex 1 trading and has explored the potential implications of the noncompetitive supply behavior for the international market of tradable permits, compliance costs for the remaining Annex 1 countries to meet their revised Kyoto targets, and the environmental effectiveness.
As the largest carbon emitter in the world, the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol has had by far the greatest impact on the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol. This There are several aspects that warrant further investigation. First, our analysis focuses on the first commitment period, and does not consider the possibility of banking of permits. It 26 is conceivable that a low price in the first commitment period will induce sellers to defer portion of their emissions permits for use in subsequent periods (Manne and Richels, 2001 ).
Such flexibility is particularly attractive if sellers expect much higher prices of permits in the subsequent periods due to a further tightening of emissions targets, reentry of the US to the Kyoto Protocol, and/or higher compliance costs encountered by themselves as their economies are expected to begin recovering in the subsequent commitment periods. Second, our analysis is based on a partial equilibrium framework, ignoring other potential effects of non-competitive supply behavior, notably the potential negative terms-of-trade consequences.
11 Thus, it would be interesting to identify the sources of the differences between the partial equilibrium results and the respective general equilibrium results, and to quantify their significance.
It should be pointed out that our analysis only examines the issue of market power on the supply side under Annex 1 trading. Some analysts (e.g., Böhringer and Löschel, 2001) suggest considering the possibility of expanding emissions trading to include developing countries via CDM to diminish FSU and EEC's ability to exercise market power.
Incorporating developing countries into an international emissions trading scheme not only increases the number of market participants, but also makes more cheap permits available.
Both effects reduce FSU and EEC's ability to exert market power. But the point is that the US withdrawal leaves plenty of excess hot air of zero costs. This will substantially reduce incentives to invest in CDM projects that imply reduced financial flows channeled to developing countries through CDM. Thus, developing countries might not oppose such a supply side cartelization so that they can benefit from the corresponding high price of permits.
After all, their certified emission reductions from CDM projects, although less costly than the equivalent amount of abatement undertaken within Annex 1 purchasing countries, are not made available at zero costs. Some OECD countries, particularly those more concerned about the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol, would also not necessarily interfere with such a move, as it would compel the remaining Kyoto-constrained Annex 1 countries to 27 undertake otherwise very little domestic abatement actions and at the same time, would still reduce their costs of compliance. 
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Appendix B: Algebraic model description
This section provides an algebraic summary of the marginal abatement costs-based, partial equilibrium model for emissions trading underlying the simulations. We begin with the model formulation for a competitive system of emissions trading accounting for hot air, i.e. the scenario TRADE. Then, we lay out the set-up for the case of non-competitive permit supply behavior. The model for the scenarios CARTEL and MONOP is described first.
Finally, the model set-up for the scenario NASH is specified.
B.1. Competitive emissions trading with hot air: TRADE
Under competitive emissions trading, all countries are price takers. Each country i minimizes its compliance costs to some exogenous target level k i. Compliance costs equal the sum of abatement costs and the costs of buying carbon permits; in the case of permit sales, the second term becomes negative, which means that the country minimizes the cost of abatement minus the income from selling permits. A country with hot air (h i ) is always selling permits.
Costs are minimized subject to the constraint that a country meets its exogenous reduction target. In other words: a country's initial endowment of permits plus the amount of permits bought or sold on the market (q i ) may not exceed the emission target level k i : The amount of hot air equals the difference between the emission target and the business-asusual emissions:
The first order condition for the cost minimization problem yields:
C h e e P ′ + − = .
(3)
In the optimum, the price taking countries abate emissions up to a level where their marginal abatement costs (C´) equal the permit price. Total costs of reducing emissions to the overall target level K = Σ k i are minimized, since all opportunities for exploiting cost differences in abatement across countries are taken. The existence of hot air does not change the costefficiency property of unrestricted competitive emission trading, since marginal abatement costs are still equalized. However, hot air sold on the permit market does not imply any effective (real) emission reduction in the hot air countries. The occurrence of traded hot air, therefore, results in an increase of overall emission compared to a situation without international emissions trading.
B.2. Non-competitive permit supply behavior
CARTEL and MONOP
Monopolistic permit supply is assumed under the scenarios CARTEL and MONOP. It is characterized as a situation in which one region (denoted "m") has supply power on the permit market while all other countries, denoted as fringe "f", behave as price takers. The monopoly region under the scenario CARTEL consists of the coordinating regions EEC and FSU, while it is only FSU under the scenario MONOP. In the latter case, EEC is assumed to be part of the fringe. The fringe countries minimize their compliance costs given the permit price set by the monopolist. They emit carbon until the marginal costs of abatement equal the permit price:
The aggregate permit demand of the fringe, which is in total a net importer of permits, is:
The monopolist sets its permit supply (q m <0) to minimize abatement costs minus income from permit sales:
where P is the inverse demand function of the fringe countries. The first order condition of the cost minimization problem indicates that the monopolist sets marginal abatement costs equal to marginal revenue:
C h e e P P Q q
Comparing Equation 1' with Equation 6, we see that marginal abatement costs are not equalized between the fringe countries and the monopolist, thus resulting in overall efficiency losses due to market power.
NASH
Under the scenario NASH it is assumed that EEC and FSU set simultaneously their quantity supplied to the permit market given one region' beliefs about the action taken by its rival. Each region, denoted "n", sets its permit supply ( ) n q to minimize abatement costs minus income from permit sales given the choice of permit supply by the other region, denoted "-n":
( ) min n n n n n n q C h e e P q + − + ⋅
s.t. n n n e k q = + ( ) 
n n n F n n C h e e P P Q
resulting in the best-response (or reaction) function for the region n (BR n ). The best-response function for the region -n (BR -n ) can be derived accordingly. A Nash equilibrium corresponds to the intersection of the best response functions of EEC and FSU. 
